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Abstract 
Most researchers acknowledge an intrinsic hierarchy in the 
scholarly journals (‘journal rank’) that they submit their work to, 
and adjust not only their submission but also their reading 
strategies accordingly. On the other hand, much has been written 
about the negative effects of institutionalizing journal rank as an 
impact measure. So far, contributions to the debate concerning the 
limitations of journal rank as a scientific impact assessment tool 
have either lacked data, or relied on only a few studies. In this 
review, we present the most recent and pertinent data on the 
consequences of our current scholarly communication system with 
respect to various measures of scientific quality (such as 
utility/citations, methodological soundness, expert ratings or 
retractions). These data corroborate previous hypotheses: using 
journal rank as an assessment tool is bad scientific practice. 
Moreover, the data lead us to argue that any journal rank (not 
only the currently-favored Impact Factor) would have this 
negative impact. Therefore, we suggest that abandoning journals 
altogether, in favor of a library-based scholarly communication 
system, will ultimately be necessary. This new system will use 
modern information technology to vastly improve the filter, sort 
and discovery functions of the current journal system. 
 
 
  
Consequences of Journal Rank 
 
3 
 
Introduction 
Science is the bedrock of modern society, improving our lives 
through advances in medicine, communication, transportation, forensics, 
entertainment and countless other areas. Moreover, today’s global 
problems cannot be solved without scientific input and understanding. 
The more our society relies on science, and the more our population 
becomes scientifically literate, the more important the reliability (i.e., 
veracity and integrity, or, ‘credibility’ (Ioannidis, 2012)) of scientific 
research becomes. Scientific research is largely a public endeavor, 
requiring public trust. Therefore, it is critical that public trust in science 
remains high. In other words, the reliability of science is not only a 
societal imperative, it is also vital to the scientific community itself. 
However, every scientific publication may in principle report results 
which prove to be unreliable, either unintentionally, in the case of 
honest error or statistical variability, or intentionally in the case of 
misconduct or fraud. Even under ideal circumstances, science can 
never provide us with absolute truth. In Karl Popper’s words: 
“Science is not a system of certain, or established, statements” 
(Popper, 1995). Peer-review is one of the mechanisms which have 
evolved to increase the reliability of the scientific literature. 
At the same time, the current publication system is being 
used to structure the careers of the members of the scientific 
community by evaluating their success in obtaining publications in 
high-ranking journals. The hierarchical publication system 
(‘journal rank’) used to communicate scientific results is thus 
central, not only to the composition of the scientific community at 
large (by selecting its members), but also to science’s position in 
society. In recent years, the scientific study of the effectiveness of 
such measures of quality control has grown. 
Retractions and the Decline Effect 
A disturbing trend has recently gained wide public 
attention: The retraction rate of articles published in scientific 
journals, which had remained stable since the 1970’s, began to 
increase rapidly in the early 2000’s from 0.001% of the total to 
about 0.02% (Figure 1a). In 2010 we have seen the creation and 
popularization of a website dedicated to monitoring retractions 
(http://retractionwatch.com), while 2011 has been described as 
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the “the year of the retraction” (Hamilton, 2011). The reasons 
suggested for retractions vary widely, with the recent sharp rise 
potentially facilitated by an increased willingness of journals to 
issue retractions, or increased scrutiny and error-detection from 
online media. Although cases of clear scientific misconduct initially 
constituted a minority of cases (Fanelli, 2009; Van Noorden, 2011; 
Wager and Williams, 2011; Nath et al., 2006; Cokol et al., 2007; 
Steen, 2011a), the fraction of retractions due to misconduct has 
risen sharper than the overall retraction rate and now the majority 
of all retractions is due to misconduct (Fang et al., 2012; Steen, 
2011b). 
Retraction notices, a metric which is relatively easy to 
collect, only constitute the extreme end of a spectrum of 
unreliability that is inherent to the scientific method: we can 
hardly ever be entirely certain of our results (Popper, 1995). Much 
of the training scientists receive aims to reduce this uncertainty 
long before the work is submitted for publication. However, a less 
readily quantified but more frequent phenomenon (compared to 
rare retractions) has recently garnered attention, which calls into 
question the effectiveness of this training. The ‘decline-effect’, 
which is now well-described, relates to the observation that the 
strength of evidence for a particular finding often declines over 
time (Schooler, 2011; Lehrer, 2010; Bertamini and Munafo, 2012; 
Palmer, 2000; Fanelli, 2010; Ioannidis, 2005b; Simmons et al., 
1999, 2011; Møller and Jennions, 2001; Møller et al., 2005; Van 
Dongen, 2011; Gonon et al., 2012). This effect provides wider 
scope for assessing the unreliability of scientific research than 
retractions alone, and allows for more general conclusions to be 
drawn. 
Researchers make choices about data collection and analysis 
which increase the chance of false-positives (i.e., researcher bias) 
(Simmons et al., 1999, 2011), and surprising and novel effects are 
more likely to be published than studies showing no effect. This is 
the well-known phenomenon of publication bias (Song et al., 1999; 
Van Dongen, 2011; Munafò et al., 2007; Young et al., 2008; 
Callaham, 2002; Møller and Jennions, 2001; Møller et al., 2005; 
Schooler, 2011; Dwan et al., 2008). In other words, the probability 
of getting a paper published might be biased towards larger initial 
effect sizes, which are revealed by later studies to be not so large (or 
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even absent entirely), leading to the decline effect. While sound 
methodology can help reduce researcher bias (Simmons et al., 
1999), publication bias is more difficult to address. Some journals 
are devoted to publishing null results, or have sections devoted to 
these, but coverage is uneven across disciplines and often these are 
not particularly high-ranking or well-read (Schooler, 2011; Nosek 
et al., 2012). Publication therein is typically not a cause for 
excitement (Giner-Sorolla, 2012; Nosek et al., 2012), leading to an 
overall low frequency of replication studies in many fields 
(Hartshorne and Schachner, 2012; Kelly, 2006; Carpenter, 2012; 
Yong, 2012; Makel et al., 2012). Publication bias is also 
exacerbated by a tendency for journals to be less likely to publish 
replication studies (or, worse still, failures to replicate) (Editorial, 
2012; Goldacre, 2011; Sutton, 2011; Hartshorne and Schachner, 
2012; Curry, 2009; Yong, 2012). Here we argue that the counter-
measures proposed to improve the reliability and veracity of 
science such as peer-review in a hierarchy of journals or 
methodological training of scientists may not be sufficient. 
While there is growing concern regarding the increasing rate 
of retractions in particular, and the unreliability of scientific 
findings in general, little consideration has been given to the 
infrastructure by which scientists not only communicate their 
findings but also evaluate each other as a potential contributing 
factor. That is, to what extent does the environment in which 
science takes place contribute to the problems described above? By 
far the most common metric by which publications are evaluated, 
at least initially, is the perceived prestige or rank of the journal in 
which they appear. Does the pressure to publish in prestigious, 
high-ranking journals contribute to the unreliability of science? 
The Decline Effect and Journal Rank 
The common pattern seen where the decline effect has been 
documented is one of an initial publication in a high-ranking 
journal, followed by attempts at replication in lower-ranked 
journals which either failed to replicate the original findings, or 
suggested a much weaker effect (Lehrer, 2010). Journal rank is 
most commonly assessed using Thomson Reuters’ Impact Factor 
(IF), which has been shown to correspond well with subjective 
ratings of journal quality and rank (Gordon, 1982; Saha et al., 
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Fig. 1: Current trends in the reliability of science.  
a – Exponential fit for PubMed retraction notices (data from pmretract.heroku.com). b –
Relationship between year of publication and individual study effect size. Data are taken from 
Munafò et al., 2007, and represent candidate gene studies of the association between DRD2 
genotype and alcoholism. The effect size (y-axis) represents the individual study effect size (odds 
ratio; OR), on a log-scale. This is plotted against the year of publication of the study (x-axis). The 
size of the circle is proportional to the IF of the journal the individual study was published in. Effect 
size is significantly negatively correlated with year of publication. c – Relationship between IF and 
extent to which an individual study overestimates the likely true effect. Data are taken from Munafò 
et al., 2009, and represent candidate gene studies of a number of gene-phenotype associations of 
psychiatric phenotypes. The bias score (y-axis) represents the effect size of the individual study 
divided by the pooled effect size estimated indicated by meta-analysis, on a log-scale. Therefore, a 
value greater than zero indicates that the study provided an over-estimate of the likely true effect 
size. This is plotted against the IF of the journal the study was published in (x-axis), on a log-scale. 
The size of the circle is proportional to the sample size of the individual study. Bias score is 
significantly positively correlated with IF, sample size significantly negatively. d – Linear 
regression with confidence intervals between IF and Fang and Casadevall’s Retraction Index (data 
provided by Fang and Casadevall, 2011). 
 
2003; Yue et al., 2007; Sønderstrup-Andersen and Sønderstrup-
Andersen, 2008). One particular case (Munafò et al., 2007) 
illustrates the decline effect (Figure 1b), and shows that early 
publications both report a larger effect than subsequent studies, 
and are also published in journals with a higher IF. These 
observations raise the more general question of whether research 
published in high-ranking journals is inherently less reliable than 
research in lower-ranking journals.  
As journal rank is also predictive of the incidence of fraud 
and misconduct in retracted publications, as opposed to other 
reasons for retraction (Steen, 2011a), it is not surprising that 
higher ranking journals are also more likely to publish fraudulent 
work than lower ranking journals (Fang et al., 2012). These data, 
however, cover only the small fraction of publications that have 
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been retracted. More important is the large body of the literature 
that is not retracted and thus actively being used by the scientific 
community. There is evidence that unreliability is higher in high-
ranking journals as well, also for non-retracted publications: A 
meta-analysis of genetic association studies provides evidence that 
the extent to which a study over-estimates the likely true effect 
size is positively correlated with the IF of the journal in which it is 
published (Figure 1c) (Munafò et al., 2009). Similar effects have 
been reported in the context of other research fields (Siontis et al., 
2011; Ioannidis, 2005a; Ioannidis and Panagiotou, 2011).  
There are additional measures of scientific quality and in 
none does journal rank fare much better. A study in 
crystallography reports that the quality of the protein structures 
described is significantly lower in publications in high-ranking 
journals (Brown and Ramaswamy, 2007). Adherence to basic 
principles of sound scientific (e.g., the CONSORT guidelines: 
http://www.consort-statement.org), or statistical methodology 
have also been tested. Four different studies on levels of evidence 
in medical and/or psychological research have found varying 
results. While two studies on surgery journals found a correlation 
between IF and the levels of evidence defined in the respective 
studies (Obremskey et al., 2005; Lau and Samman, 2007), a study 
of anesthesia journals failed to find any statistically significant 
correlation between journal rank and evidence-based medicine 
principles (Bain and Myles, 2005) and a study of seven 
medical/psychological journals found highly varying adherence to 
statistical guidelines, irrespective of journal rank (Tressoldi et al., 
2013). The two surgery studies covered an IF range between 0.5 
and 2.0, and 0.7 and 1.2, respectively, while the anesthesia study 
covered the range 0.8 to 3.5. It is possible that any correlation at 
the lower end of the scale is abolished when higher rank journals 
are included. The study by Tressoldi and colleagues, which 
included very high ranking journals, supports this interpretation. 
Importantly, if publications in higher ranking journals were 
methodologically sounder, then one would expect the opposite 
result: inclusion of high-ranking journals should result in a 
stronger, not a weaker correlation. Further supporting the notion 
that journal rank is a poor predictor of statistical soundness is our 
own analysis of data on statistical power in neuroscience studies 
(Button et al., 2013). There was no significant correlation between 
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statistical power and journal rank (N=650; rs=-0.01; t=0.8; Figure 
2). Thus, the currently available data seem to indicate that 
journal rank is a poor indicator of methodological soundness.  
Beyond explicit quality metrics and sound methodology, 
reproducibility is at the core of the scientific method and thus a 
hallmark of scientific quality. Three recent studies reported 
attempts to replicate published findings in preclinical medicine 
(Scott et al., 2008; Begley and Ellis, 2012; Prinz et al., 2011). All 
three found a very low frequency of replication, suggesting that 
maybe only one out of five preclinical findings is reproducible. In 
fact, the level of reproducibility was so low that no relationship 
between journal rank and reproducibility could be detected. Hence, 
these data support the necessity of recent efforts such as the 
‘Reproducibility Initiative’ (Baker, 2012) or the “Reproducibility 
Project” (Collaboration, 2012) . In fact, the data also indicate that 
these projects may consider starting with replicating findings 
published in high-ranking journals. 
Given all of the above evidence, it is therefore not 
surprising that journal rank is also a strong predictor of the rate of 
 
Fig. 2: No association between statistical power and journal IF. 
The statistical power of 650 neuroscience studies (data from Button et al. 2013; 19 missing ref; 3 
unclear reporting; 57 published in journal without 2011 IF; 1 book) plotted as a function of the 2011 
IF of the publishing journal.  The studies were selected from the 730 contributing to the meta-
analyses included in Button et al. 2013, Table 1, and included where journal title and IF (2011 © 
Thomson Reuters Journal Citation Reports) were available. 
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retractions (Figure 1d) (Fang and Casadevall, 2011; Liu, 2006; 
Cokol et al., 2007).  
Social pressure and journal rank 
There are thus several converging lines of evidence which 
indicate that publications in high ranking journals are not only 
more likely to be fraudulent than articles in lower ranking 
journals, but also more likely to present discoveries which are less 
reliable (i.e., are inflated, or cannot subsequently be replicated). 
Some of the sociological mechanisms behind these correlations 
have been documented, such as pressure to publish (preferably 
positive results in high-ranking journals), leading to the potential 
for decreased ethical standards (Anderson et al., 2007) and 
increased publication bias in highly competitive fields (Fanelli, 
2010). The general increase in competitiveness, and the 
precariousness of scientific careers (Shapin, 2008), may also lead to 
an increased publication bias across the sciences (Fanelli, 2011). 
This evidence supports earlier propositions about social pressure 
being a major factor driving misconduct and publication bias 
(Giles, 2007), eventually culminating in retractions in the most 
extreme cases. 
That being said, it is clear that the correlation between 
journal rank and retraction rate is likely too strong (coefficient of 
determination of 0.77; data from (Fang and Casadevall, 2011)) to 
be explained exclusively by the decreased reliability of the research 
published in high ranking journals. Probably, additional factors 
contribute to this effect. For instance, one such factor may be the 
greater visibility of publications in these journals, which is both 
one of the incentives driving publication bias, and a likely 
underlying cause for the detection of error or misconduct with the 
eventual retraction of the publications as a result (Cokol et al., 
2007). Conversely, the scientific community may also be less 
concerned about incorrect findings published in more obscure 
journals. With respect to the latter, the finding that the large 
majority of retractions come from the numerous lower-ranking 
journals (Fang et al., 2012) reveals that publications in lower 
ranking journals are scrutinized and, if warranted, retracted. Thus, 
differences in scrutiny are likely to be only a contributing factor 
and not an exclusive explanation, either. With respect to the 
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former, visibility effects in general can be quantified by measuring 
citation rates between journals, testing the assumption that if 
higher visibility were a contributing factor to retractions, it must 
also contribute to citations. 
Journal Rank and Study Impact 
Thus far we have presented evidence that research 
published in high-ranking journals may be less reliable compared 
with publications in lower-ranking journals. Nevertheless, there is 
a strong common perception that high-ranking journals publish 
‘better’ or ‘more important’ science, and that the IF captures this 
well (Gordon, 1982; Saha et al., 2003). The assumption is that 
high-ranking journals are able to be highly selective and publish 
only the most important, novel and best-supported scientific 
discoveries, which will then, as a consequence of their quality, go 
on to be highly cited (Young et al., 2008). One way to reconcile 
this common perception with the data would be that, while 
journal rank may be indicative of a minority of unreliable 
publications, it may also (or more strongly) be indicative of the 
importance of the majority of remaining, reliable publications. 
Indeed, a recent study on clinical trial meta-analyses found that a 
measure for the novelty of a clinical trial’s main outcome did 
correlate significantly with journal rank (Evangelou et al., 2012). 
Compared to this relatively weak correlation (with all coefficients 
of determination lower than 0.1), a stronger correlation was 
reported for journal rank and expert ratings of importance (Allen 
et al., 2009). In this study, the journal in which the study had 
appeared was not masked, thus not excluding the strong 
correlation between subjective journal rank and journal quality as 
a confounding factor. Nevertheless, there is converging evidence 
from two studies that journal rank is indeed indicative of a 
publication’s perceived importance.  
Beyond the importance or novelty of the research, there are 
three additional reasons why publications in high-ranking journals 
might receive a high number of citations. First, publications in 
high-ranking journals achieve greater exposure by virtue not only 
of the larger circulation of the journal in which they appear, but 
also of the more prominent media attention (Gonon et al., 2012). 
Second, citing high-ranking publications in one’s own publication 
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Fig. 3: Trends in predicting citations from journal rank. 
The coefficient of determination (R2) between journal rank (as measured by IF) and the citations 
accruing over two years after publications is plotted as a function of publication year in a sample of 
almost 30 million publications. Lozano et al. (2012) make the case that one can explain the trends in 
the predictive value of journal rank by the publication of the IF in the 1960s (R2 increase is 
accelerating) and the widespread adoption of internet searches in the 1990s (R2 is dropping). The 
data support the interpretation that reading habits drive the correlation between journal rank and 
citations more than any inherent quality of the articles. IFs before the invention of the IF have been 
retroactively computed for the years before the 1960s. 
may increase its perceived value. Third, the novel, surprising, 
counter-intuitive or controversial findings often published in high-
ranking journals, draw citations not only from follow-up studies 
but also from news-type articles in scholarly journals reporting and 
discussing the discovery. Despite these four factors, which would 
suggest considerable effects of journal rank on future citations, it 
has been established for some time that the actual effect of journal 
rank is measurable, but nowhere near as substantial as indicated 
(Hegarty and Walton, 2012; Seglen, 1997; Callaham, 2002; Kravitz 
and Baker, 2011; Chow et al., 2007; Seglen, 1994; Finardi, 2013) 
and as one would expect if visibility were the exclusive factor 
driving retractions. In fact, the average effect sizes roughly 
approach those for journal rank and unreliability, cited above. 
The data presented in a recent analysis of the development 
of these correlations between IF-based journal rank and future 
citations over the period from 1902-2009 (with IFs before the 
1960s computed retroactively) reveal two very informative trends 
(Figure 3, data from (Lozano et al., 2012). First, while the 
Consequences of Journal Rank 
 
12 
 
predictive power of journal rank remained very low for the entire 
first two thirds of the 20th century, it started to slowly increase 
shortly after the publication of the first IF data in the 1960’s. This 
correlation kept increasing until the second interesting trend 
emerged with the advent of the internet and keyword-search 
engines in the 1990’s, from which time on it fell back to pre-1960’s 
levels until the end of the study period in 2009. Overall, consistent 
with the citation data already available, the coefficient of 
determination between journal rank and citations was always in 
the range of ~0.1 to 0.3 (i.e., quite low). It thus appears that 
indeed a small but significant correlation between journal rank and 
future citations can be observed. Moreover, the data suggest that 
most of this small effect stems from visibility effects due to the 
influence of the IF on reading habits  (Lozano et al., 2012), rather 
than from factors intrinsic to the published articles (see data cited 
above). However, the correlation is so weak that it cannot alone 
account for the strong correlation between retractions and journal 
rank, but instead requires additional factors, such as the increased 
unreliability of publications in high ranking journals cited above. 
Supporting these weak correlations between journal rank and 
future citations are data reporting classification errors (i.e., 
whether a publication received too many or too few citations with 
regard to the rank of the journal it was published in) at or 
exceeding 30% (Chow et al., 2007; Kravitz and Baker, 2011; Singh 
et al., 2007; Starbuck, 2005). In fact, these classification errors, in 
conjunction with the weak citation advantage, render journal rank 
practically useless as an evaluation signal, even if there was no 
indication of less reliable science being published in high ranking 
journals. 
The only measure of citation count that does correlate 
strongly with journal rank (negatively) is the number of articles 
without any citations at all (Weale et al., 2004), supporting the 
argument that fewer articles in high-ranking journals go unread. 
Thus, there is quite extensive evidence arguing for the strong 
correlation between journal rank and retraction rate to be mainly 
due to two factors: there is direct evidence that the social 
pressures to publish in high ranking journals increases the 
unreliability, intentional or not, of the research published there. 
There is more indirect evidence, derived mainly from citation data, 
indicating that increased visibility of publications in high ranking 
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journals may potentially contribute to increased error-detection in 
these journals. With several independent measures failing to 
provide compelling evidence that journal rank is a reliable 
predictor of scientific impact or quality, and other measures 
indicating that journal rank is at least equally if not more 
predictive of low reliability, the central role of journal rank in 
modern science deserves close scrutiny. 
Practical consequences of Journal 
Rank 
Even if a particular study has been performed to the 
highest standards, the quest for publication in high-ranking 
journals slows down the dissemination of science and increases the 
burden on reviewers, by iterations of submissions and rejections 
cascading down the hierarchy of journal rank (Statzner and Resh, 
2010; Kravitz and Baker, 2011; Nosek and Bar-Anan, 2012). A 
recent study seems to suggest that such rejections eventually 
improve manuscripts enough to yield measurable citation benefits 
(Calcagno et al., 2012). However, the effect size of such 
resubmissions appears to be of the order of 0.1 citations per 
article, a statistically significant but, in practical terms, negligible 
effect. This conclusion is corroborated by an earlier study which 
failed to find any such effect (Nosek and Bar-Anan, 2012). 
Moreover, with peer-review costs estimated in excess of 2.2 billion 
€ (US$~2.8b) annually (Research Information Network, 2008), the 
resubmission cascade contributes to the already rising costs of 
journal rank: the focus on journal rank has allowed corporate 
publishers to keep their most prestigious journals closed-access and 
to increase subscription prices (Kyrillidou et al., 2012), creating 
additional barriers to the dissemination of science. The argument 
from highly selective journals is that their per-article cost would 
be too high for author processing fees, which may be up to 37,000€ 
(US$48,000) for the journal Nature (House of Commons, 2004). 
There is also evidence from one study in economics suggesting that 
journal rank can contribute to suppression of interdisciplinary 
research (Rafols et al., 2012), keeping disciplines separate and 
isolated. 
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Finally, the attention given to publication in high-ranking 
journals may distort the communication of scientific progress, both 
inside and outside of the scientific community. For instance, the 
recent discovery of a ‘Default-Mode Network’ in rodent brains 
was, presumably, made independently by two different sets of 
neuroscientists and published only a few months apart (Lu et al., 
2012; Upadhyay et al., 2011). The later, but not the earlier, 
publication (Lu et al., 2012) was cited in a subsequent high-
ranking publication (Welberg, 2012). Despite both studies largely 
reporting identical findings (albeit, perhaps, with different 
quality), the later report has garnered 19 citations, while the 
earlier one only 5, at the time of this writing. We do not know of 
any empirical studies quantitatively addressing this particular 
effect of journal rank. However, a similar distortion due to 
selective attention to publications in high-ranking journals has 
been reported in a study on medical research. This study found 
media reporting to be distorted, such that once initial findings in 
higher-ranking journals have been refuted by publications in lower 
ranking journals (a case of decline effect), they do not receive 
adequate media coverage (Gonon et al., 2012). 
Impact Factor – Negotiated, 
irreproducible and unsound 
The IF is a metric for the number of citations to articles in 
a journal (the numerator), normalized by the number of articles in 
that journal (the denominator). However, there is evidence that IF 
is, at least in some cases, not calculated but negotiated, that it is 
not reproducible, and that, even if it were reproducibly computed, 
the way it is derived is not mathematically sound. The fact that 
publishers have the option to negotiate how their IF is calculated 
is well-established – in the case of PLoS Medicine, the negotiation 
range was between 2 and about 11 (The PLoS Medicine Editors, 
2006). What is negotiated is the denominator in the IF equation 
(i.e., which published articles which are counted), given that all 
citations count towards the numerator whether they result from 
publications included in the denominator or not. It has thus been 
public knowledge for quite some time now that removing editorials 
and News-and-Views articles from the denominator (so called 
“front-matter”) can dramatically alter the resulting IF (Editorial, 
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JCR Science Edition 2002 504 528 n.c. 1032 7231 7.007 
JCR Science Edition 2003 n.c. 300 334 634 7551 11.910 
 
Table 1: Thomson Reuters’ IF calculations for the journal ‘Current Biology’ in the years 
2002/2003. 
Most of the rise in IF is due to the reduction in published items. Note the discrepancy between the 
number of items published in 2001 between the two consecutive JCR Science Editions. – n.c.: year 
not covered by this edition. Raw data see Suppl. Fig. S1. 
 
2005; Garfield, 1999; Adam, 2002; Moed and Van Leeuwen, 1995; 
Moed and van Leeuwen, 1996; Hernán, 2009; Baylis et al., 1999). 
While these IF negotiations are rarely made public, the number of 
citations (numerator) and published articles (denominator) used to 
calculate IF are accessible via Journal Citation Reports. This 
database can be searched for evidence that the IF has been 
negotiated. For instance, the numerator and denominator values 
for Current Biology in 2002 and 2003 indicate that while the 
number of citations remained relatively constant, the number of 
published articles dropped. This decrease occurred after the 
journal was purchased by Cell Press (an imprint of Elsevier), 
despite there being no change in the layout of the journal. 
Critically, the arrival of a new publisher corresponded with a 
retrospective change in the denominator used to calculate IF 
(Table 1). Similar procedures raised the IF of FASEB Journal 
from 0.24 in 1988 to 18.3 in 1989, when conference abstracts 
ceased to count towards the denominator (Baylis et al., 1999).  
In an attempt to test the accuracy of the ranking of some of 
their journals by IF, Rockefeller University Press purchased access 
to the citation data of their journals and some competitors. They 
found numerous discrepancies between the data they received and 
the published rankings, sometimes leading to differences of up to 
19% (Rossner et al., 2007). When asked to explain this 
discrepancy, Thomson Reuters replied that they routinely use 
several different databases and had accidentally sent Rockefeller 
University Press the wrong one. Despite this, a second database 
sent also did not match the published records. This is only one of 
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a number reported errors and inconsistencies (Reedijk, 1998; Moed 
et al., 1996).  
It is well-known that citation data are strongly left-skewed, 
meaning that a small number of publications receive a large 
number of citations, while most publications receive very few 
(Rossner et al., 2007; Seglen, 1992, 1997; Kravitz and Baker, 2011; 
Editorial, 2005; Chow et al., 2007; Weale et al., 2004; Taylor et 
al., 2008). The use of an arithmetic mean as a measure of central 
tendency on such data (rather than, say, the median) is clearly 
inappropriate, but this is exactly what is used in the IF 
calculation. The International Mathematical Union reached the 
same conclusion in an analysis of the IF (Adler et al., 2008). A 
recent study correlated the median citation frequency in a sample 
of 100 journals with their two-year IF and found a very strong 
correlation, which is expected due to the similarly left-skewed 
distributions in most journals (Editorial, 2013). However, at the 
time of this writing, it is not known if using the median (instead of 
the mean) improves any of the predominantly weak predictive 
properties of journal rank. Complementing the specific flaws just 
mentioned, a recent, comprehensive review of the bibliometric 
literature lists various additional shortcomings of the IF more 
generally (Vanclay, 2011).  
Conclusions 
While at this point it seems impossible to quantify the 
relative contributions of the different factors influencing the 
reliability of scientific publications, the current empirical literature 
on the effects of journal rank provides evidence supporting the 
following four conclusions: 1) journal rank is a weak to moderate 
predictor of utility and perceived importance; 2) journal rank is a 
moderate to strong predictor of both intentional and unintentional 
scientific unreliability; 3) journal rank is expensive, delays science 
and frustrates researchers; and, 4) journal rank as established by 
IF violates even the most basic scientific standards, but predicts 
subjective judgments of journal quality.  
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Caveats 
While our latter two conclusions appear uncontroversial, 
the former two are counter-intuitive and require explanation. 
Weak correlations between future citations and journal rank based 
on IF may be caused by the poor statistical properties of the IF. 
This explanation could (and should) be tested by using any of the 
existing alternative ranking tools available (such as Thomson 
Reuters’ Eigenfactor, Scopus’ SCImagoJournalRank, or Google’s 
Scholar Metrics etc.) and computing correlations with the metrics 
discussed above. However, a recent analysis shows a high 
correlation between these ranks, so no large differences would be 
expected (Lopez-Cozar and Cabezas-Clavijo, 2013). Alternatively, 
one can choose other important metrics and compute which 
journals score particularly high on these. Either way, since the IF 
reflects the common perception of journal hierarchies rather well 
(Gordon, 1982; Saha et al., 2003; Yue et al., 2007; Sønderstrup-
Andersen and Sønderstrup-Andersen, 2008), any alternative 
hierarchy that would better reflect article citation frequencies 
might violate this intuitive sense of journal rank, as different ways 
to compute journal rank lead to different hierarchies (Wagner, 
2011). Both alternatives thus challenge our subjective journal 
ranking. To put it more bluntly, if perceived importance and 
utility were to be discounted as indirect proxies of quality, while 
retraction rate, replicability, effect size overestimation, correct 
sample sizes, crystallographic quality, sound methodology and so 
on counted as more direct measures of quality, then inversing the 
current IF-based journal hierarchy would improve the alignment of 
journal rank for most and have no effect on the rest of these more 
direct measures of quality. 
The subjective journal hierarchy also leads to a circularity 
that confounds many empirical studies. That is, authors use 
journal rank, in part, to make decisions of where to submit their 
manuscripts, such that well-performed studies yielding ground-
breaking discoveries with general implications are preferentially 
submitted to high-ranking journals. Readers, in turn, expect only 
to read about such articles in high-ranking journals, leading to the 
exposure and visibility confounds discussed above and at length in 
the cited literature. Moreover, citation practices and 
methodological standards vary in different scientific fields, 
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potentially distorting both the citation and reliability data. Given 
these confounds one might expect highly varying and often 
inconclusive results. Despite this, the literature contains evidence 
for associations between journal rank and measures of scientific 
impact (e.g., citations, importance, unread articles), but also 
contains at least equally strong, consistent effects of journal rank 
predicting scientific unreliability (e.g., retractions, effect size, 
sample size, replicability, fraud/misconduct, methodology). Neither 
group of studies can thus be easily dismissed, suggesting that the 
incentives journal rank creates for the scientific community (to 
submit either their best or their most unreliable work to the most 
high-ranking journals) at best cancel each other out. Such 
unintended consequences are well-known from other fields where 
metrics are applied (Hauser and Katz, 1998). 
Therefore, while there are concerns not only about the 
validity of the IF as the metric of choice for establishing journal 
rank but also about confounding factors complicating the 
interpretation of some of the data, we find, in the absence of 
additional data, that these concerns do not suffice to substantially 
question our conclusions, but do emphasize the need for future 
research. 
Potential long-term consequences of 
journal rank 
Taken together, the reviewed literature suggests that using 
journal rank is unhelpful at best and unscientific at worst. In our 
view, IF generates an illusion of exclusivity and prestige based on 
an assumption that it will predict subsequent impact, which is not 
supported by empirical data. As the IF aligns well with intuitive 
notions of journal hierarchies (Gordon, 1982; Saha et al., 2003; 
Yue et al., 2007), it receives insufficient scrutiny (Frank, 2003) 
(perhaps a case of confirmation bias). The one field in which 
journal rank is scrutinized is bibliometrics. We have reviewed the 
pertinent empirical literature to supplement the largely 
argumentative discussion on the opinion pages of many learned 
journals (Adler and Harzing, 2009; Bauer, 2004; Lawrence, 2002; 
Brumback, 2012; Lawrence, 2007, 2008; Garwood, 2011; Taylor et 
al., 2008; Tsikliras, 2008; Todd and Ladle, 2008; Giles, 2007; Moed 
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and van Leeuwen, 1996; Editorial, 2005; Sarewitz, 2012; Schooler, 
2011) with empirical data. Much like dowsing, homeopathy or 
astrology, journal rank seems to appeal to subjective impressions 
of certain effects, but these effects disappear as soon as they are 
subjected to scientific scrutiny. 
In our understanding of the data, the social and 
psychological influences described above are, at least to some 
extent, generated by journal rank itself, which in turn may 
contribute to the observed decline effect and rise in retraction rate. 
That is, systemic pressures on the author, rather than increased 
scrutiny on the part of the reader, inflate the unreliability of much 
scientific research. Without reform of our publication system, the 
incentives associated with increased pressure to publish in high-
ranking journals will continue to encourage scientists to be less 
cautious in their conclusions (or worse), in an attempt to market 
their research to the top journals (Anderson et al., 2007; Fanelli, 
2010; Shapin, 2008; Giles, 2007; Munafò et al., 2009). This is 
reflected in the decline in null results reported across disciplines 
and countries (Fanelli, 2011), and corroborated by the findings 
that much of the increase in retractions may be due to misconduct 
(Steen, 2011b; Fang et al., 2012), and that much of this 
misconduct occurs in studies published high-ranking journals 
(Steen, 2011a; Fang et al., 2012). Inasmuch as journal rank guides 
the appointment and promotion policies of research institutions, 
the increasing rate of misconduct that has recently been observed 
may prove to be but the beginning of a pandemic: It is conceivable 
that, for the last few decades, research institutions world-wide may 
have been hiring and promoting scientists who excel at marketing 
their work to top journals, but who are not necessarily equally 
good at conducting their research. Conversely, these institutions 
may have purged excellent scientists from their ranks, whose 
marketing skills did not meet institutional requirements. If this 
interpretation of the data is correct, a generation of excellent 
marketers (possibly, but not necessarily, also excellent scientists) 
now serve as the leading figures and role models of the scientific 
enterprise, constituting another potentially major contributing 
factor to the rise in retractions. 
The implications of the data presented here go beyond the 
reliability of scientific publications – public trust in science and 
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scientists has been in decline for some time in many countries 
(Gauchat, 2010; EuropeanCommission, 2010; Nowotny, 2005), 
dramatically so in some sections of society (Gauchat, 2012), 
culminating in the sentiment that scientists are nothing more than 
yet another special interest group (Miller, 2012; Sarewitz, 2013). In 
the words of Daniel Sarewitz: “Nothing will corrode public trust 
more than a creeping awareness that scientists are unable to live 
up to the standards that they have set for themselves” (Sarewitz, 
2012). The data presented here prompt the suspicion that the 
corrosion has already begun and that journal rank may have 
played a part in this decline as well.  
Alternatives 
Alternatives to journal rank exist – we now have technology 
at our disposal which allows us to perform all of the functions 
journal rank is currently supposed to perform in an unbiased, 
dynamic way on a per-article basis, allowing the research 
community greater control over selection, filtering, and ranking of 
scientific information (Lin, 2012; Kravitz and Baker, 2011; Priem 
et al., 2012; Hönekopp and Khan, 2011; Roemer and Borchardt, 
2012; Priem, 2013). Since there is no technological reason to 
continue using journal rank, one implication of the data reviewed 
here is that we can instead use current technology and remove the 
need for a journal hierarchy completely. As we have argued, it is 
not only technically obsolete, but also counter-productive and a 
potential threat to the scientific endeavor. We therefore would 
favor bringing scholarly communication back to the research 
institutions in an archival publication system in which both 
software, raw data and their text descriptions are archived and 
made accessible, after peer-review and with scientifically-tested 
metrics accruing reputation in a constantly improving reputation 
system (Eve, 2012). This reputation system would be subjected to 
the same standards of scientific scrutiny as are commonly applied 
to all scientific matters and evolve to minimize gaming and 
maximize the alignment of researchers’ interests with those of 
science (which are currently misaligned (Nosek et al., 2012)). Only 
an elaborate ecosystem of a multitude of metrics can provide the 
flexibility to capitalize on the small fraction of the multi-faceted 
scientific output that is actually quantifiable. Such an ecosystem 
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would evolve such that the only evolutionary stable strategy is to 
try and do the best science one can. 
The currently balkanized literature, with a lack of 
interoperability and standards as one of its many detrimental, 
unintended consequences, prevents the kind of innovation that 
gave rise to the discover functions of Amazon or eBay, the social 
networking functions of Facebook or Reddit and course the sort 
and search functions of Google – all technologies virtually every 
scientist uses regularly for all activities but science. Thus, 
fragmentation and the resulting lack of access and interoperability 
are among the main underlying reasons why journal rank has not 
yet been replaced by more scientific evaluation options, despite 
widespread access to article-level metrics today. With an openly 
accessible scholarly literature standardized for interoperability, it 
would of course still be possible to pay professional editors to 
select publications, as is the case now, but after publication. These 
editors would then actually compete with each other for paying 
customers, accumulating track records for selecting (or missing) 
the most important discoveries. Likewise, virtually any 
functionality the current system offers would easily be replicable in 
the system we envisage. However, above and beyond replicating 
current functionality, an open, standardized scholarly literature 
would place any and all thinkable scientific metrics only a few 
lines of code away, offering the possibility of a truly open 
evaluation system where any hypothesis can be tested. Metrics, 
social networks and intelligent software then can provide each 
individual user with regular, customized updates on the most 
relevant research. These updates respond to the behavior of the 
user and learn from and evolve with their preferences. With openly 
accessible, interoperable literature, data and software, agents can 
be developed that independently search for hypotheses in the vast 
knowledge accumulating there. But perhaps most importantly, 
with an openly accessible database of science, innovation can 
thrive, bringing us features and ideas nobody can think of today 
and nobody will ever be capable of imagining, if we do not bring 
the products of our labor back under our own control. It was the 
hypertext transfer protocol (http) standard that spurred 
innovation and made the internet what it is today. What is 
required is the equivalent of http for scholarly literature, data and 
software. 
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 Funds currently spent on journal subscriptions could easily 
suffice to finance the initial conversion of scholarly communication, 
even if only as long-term savings. One avenue to move in this 
direction may be the recently announced Episcience Project (Van 
Noorden, 2013). Other solutions certainly exist (Beverungen et al., 
2012; Nosek and Bar-Anan, 2012; Kriegeskorte et al., 2012; 
Bachmann, 2011; Birukou et al., 2011; Florian, 2012; Ghosh et al., 
2012; Hunter, 2012; Ietto-Gillies, 2012; Kreiman and Maunsell, 
2011; Kriegeskorte, 2012; Lee, 2012; Pöschl, 2012; Priem and 
Hemminger, 2012; Sandewall, 2012; Walther and van den Bosch, 
2012; Wicherts et al., 2012; Yarkoni, 2012; Zimmermann et al., 
2011; Hartshorne and Schachner, 2012; Kravitz and Baker, 2011), 
but the need for an alternative system is clearly pressing 
(Casadevall and Fang, 2012). Given the data we surveyed above, 
almost anything appears superior to the status quo.  
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Suppl. Fig. S1: Impact Factor of the journal „Current Biology“ in the 
years 2002 (above) and 2003 (below) showing a 40% increase in impact.  
The increase in the IF of the journal “Current Biology” from approx. 7 to 
almost 12 from one edition of Thomson Reuters’ “Journal Citation 
Reports” to the next is due to a retrospective adjustment of the number of 
items published (marked), while the actual citations remained relatively 
constant. 
 
